Anything that claims to add to our knowledge must, without exception, identify who the author is, together with their background, if not already known. Without that, the essential peer-review process cannot even begin and the scriptures concerned must be consigned to the dusty unconfirmed-reports cabinet.  It is already more than evident that vested interests have influenced the content. They may even have written it.

I am about to suggest that flueless gas fires are illegal in the EU, for reasons helpfully provided by the advertorial, but you can make your own mind up in a minute, all data is provided.  The problem is that we all tend to accept what we are spoon-fed by the alleged experts and it is perhaps time we started thinking more for ourselves. The advertorial is tainted with the pungent odour of vested interests, so hold your nose and read on.

That said there are issues we can't ignore and it is important not to overlook those when dismissing the obviously unsafe arguments and that is the danger with advertorials. Fact and fiction become blurred, making professional judgements more difficult, in the one place they should not be more difficult. There needs to be absolute trust on both sides and that is being put at risk.

The bold-type lead-in to the advertorial acknowledges there is “debate about their safety” and “some resistance” to their use. Unfortunately they do not say why. They know why but they choose, being biased, not to say it. That is what is known as a common-or-garden understatement. The lead-in claims the advertorial sets out to “separate fact from fiction”. It actually succeeds in blurring the boundary between the two, thus muddling issues that need to be examined scientifically, with the red-herrings.

Ventilation

The clever bit of the advertorial lead-in is the last sentence, tagged on after a comma and presented in such a way as to imply past confusion by Installers, relating to ventilation requirements. That is not true and never has been the case. In reality the ventilation requirements have always been simple and clear, certainly those I've seen. As usual there is a reason.

What that actually disguises is the recent and revised, by the authorities, ventilation requirements since the flueless gas fire tragedy in Wales, where the “safety device” required “to meet CE approval requirements” did not work. It was supplied and fitted during manufacture. It was not tampered with in any way. Yet it did not work and that was clearly a situation it was designed for.

The increased flueless gas fire ventilation minimum requirements can now claim to be with the most stringent for any gas appliance, pound for pound. That includes the grossly inefficient DFE or Decorative Fuel Effect gas fires. The DFE that lecturers on ACS courses have banged on about, as being a potentially serious source of carbon monoxide (CO) risk. The latter of course are designed to produce CO, without which we would not have the pretty yellow-tinged flames and the good old-fashioned soot seen on the coals; they at least have a flue.

The beefed up ventilation requirement alters the dynamics and the former appeal of flueless gas fires. Does the customer want a permanent hole in the wall on aggregate as big or bigger than a 100mm (4") diameter sphere. I wonder how long it will be before such a vent disappears under a layer of impervious scepticism. The risk is far greater with flueless than any other appliance.

Despite the recently revised ventilation requirements, another concern has arisen in my mind, following all the debate on flueless gas fires. That of air movement. Open-flue gas fires and boilers promote air movement. With flueless, no matter how big the ventilation, there is no purpose-made air movement and that needs to be revisited in my opinion.

Catalytic converter

Flueless gas fires – without catalytic converters – were being used in the UK when I was a kid. There may still be some out there, usually installed to serve the hall, stairs and landing, of low heat-input, to take the chill off less pampered earlier generations.

The advertorial boasts that flueless gas fire tests are undertaken without the catalytic converter fitted. What relevance that is without any hint of context, is far from clear. I smell red-herrings. Nevertheless the authorities insist on catalytic converters being fitted.

Even more absurd is mention (page 37) that flueless gas fires have to operate safely in an air-tight room with catalytic converter disabled. What is that supposed to imply. No mention of the size of room or how long for. No mention of anything else at all actually. Hardly scientific, that statement is another red-herring intended to dissuade us from exploring further. It is meaningless as a stand-alone comment.

You don’t need to be a Registered Gas Installer to figure out that ultimately in an air-tight room, vitiation will, indeed must occur, in the presence of any combustion process. That is a law of nature. Besides there have been enough movies with scenes of trapped human-beings gasping for air (oxygen) in a small space, with no artificial combustion taking place.

Not least, the statement is an insult to the intelligence of professional Installers, though the whole advertorial is laced with red-herrings.

Claims

The bigger the number the better. The anonymous author of the advertorial has mentioned a figure of seventy million flueless gas fires being installed in the USA and Japan.  No mention of any other data whatsoever. It is meaningless in isolation and of course proves nothing. Totally ignore it. They have not mentioned that the more commercially sober Canada banned flueless gas fires outright.

Manufacturers do make errors, yet here they are trying to blind us with science, to protect their vested interests. I say ignore all that and take a critical look at all the real evidence, some of which has yet to be aired.

Safety device

“Additionally, to meet the CE approval requirements, all flueless space heaters must be fitted with a safety device that is designed to cut off the gas supply to the burner and hence turn off the appliance off (sic) should the CO² (sic) level fall below a pre-determined level”.

Alleged safety device: We now know from that flueless gas fire tragedy in Wales that they do not work. That case was a classic test and it failed. Indeed they can’t work.

More information will be found in the detailed and no doubt accurate statement-summary by the specialist inspector who actually attended the crime scene and subsequent testing of the faulty appliance, as well as a new one of the same model for comparison. The names were erased in that statement for obvious reasons.

The appliance installation instructions (I have a copy) clearly state that the ventilation provided should not be "under or within immediate vicinity of the appliance". It was actually fitted within one metre and from that I would infer more than (say) 900mm.

Whether that constitutes 'immediate vicinity' is debatable. We have been used to seeing vents as close as possible to appliances (usually back-boiler units) to obviate the risk of draughts (to householders not the appliance) and reduce the risk of consumers blocking vents.

The specialist inspector said "I am of the opinion that the ventilation grille fitted alongside the fire had a detrimental effect on the operation of the oxygen depletion system (ODS) in that cold fresh air was entering the room at low level and preventing the oxygen depletion system from operating at an early stage".

Please note that is purely an opinion and I can say I do not accept that. I do not agree or disagree. I am not in the slightest interested in the fate of the Installer, only the fate of future consumers.

Interestingly the Burley website (accessed 26.07.2009) states on ventilation "An air vent which provides not less than 100cm2 free air must be installed in the room, at least 1 metre away from the fire. A chimney, ceiling or floor vent is not suitable" - But only one metre, too close to call I would suggest.

Given the importance of the subject,  the manual should have been clearer on that matter. If it genuinely was so critical how did they know it was. If they had data in support they should have shared that data, and not just post sloppy advice. Absence of that clarity clearly amounts to gross negligence. They could have said at least one metre.

In my opinion it would have made no difference where the vent was and with our CCN1 knowledge I'm sure we all know that.  A vent at high level may have made a difference but all this is speculative and unproven, including the specialist inspector's opinion. In his position, and I have often been in that position on other subjects, I would have called for definitive proof one way or the other. We need to know for the test of beyond-reasonable-doubt and for the well-being of future consumers.

It necessarily follows that flueless gas fires, until proven otherwise, do not meet CE approval requirements. 

I want to see rock solid scientific evidence that any safety device will work in precisely the same set-up where the tragedy occurred, vent and all, as it should. Until that proof is forthcoming as far as I am concerned they are illegal and unsafe installations. Not appliances but installations. The CE requirements demand a safety device and so do I.

The safety devices we have been told a lot about. Known by the popular term ‘oxypilot’, they are also commonly referred to as the ODS (Oxygen Depletion Sensor) and ASD (Atmosphere Sensing Device). One smug lecturer pointed out to me that the ASD does not detect CO but we all know that anyway. No one I know ever thought they did. What one earth was he driving at I wonder. Whatever it is supposed to do, it did not work.

If the air at the oxypilot is vitiated, ultimately the laws of nature kick-in and the horizontal flame loses the battle for oxygen, which favours the vertical flame. Once the horizontal flame is lost the thermocouple quickly cools and the gas valve shuts down.

Providing of course the air is vitiated, and therein lies the problem. Carbon monoxide's specific gravity is 0.9657 and although almost the same as air which is 1.0 it is invariably combined with heat in this scenario and inevitably rises, as it must do anyway.

There is also reference to the house concerned being open-plan. All homes above one-storey are open-plan in this context if doors are left open, even slightly. I am a Building Surveyor with experience of fire and smoke protection. That argument again proves the ODS will never work or get chance to work. The young lady’s dog was dead on the ground floor.  If that vent had been fitted a lot further away it is possible the dog might have survived, but not the young lady upstairs. Would you gamble on that. I know I wouldn't.

Are we now to advise customers to keep certain doors shut at all times when these appliances are working. We should note also that BS 5871-4: 2007 is referred to in the advertorial in the context of appliance use. Secondary heating only, which infers limited use, but does not clarify why.

That of course reminds us of the single-point flueless water heaters (no catalytic converter) which we have to ensure carry a not-more-than-five-minutes-use warning label. No mention of any such warning on the flueless gas fire 'installation and user instructions'.

Ultimately any ODS must work once vitiated air reaches the floor surface itself. By then of course it is far too late. The truth is clear that ODS devices do not work in the real world and no amount of waffle can convince me otherwise. Bring me scientific proof and I will publish it.

Flueless gas fire installations are potentially dangerous. If one suddenly develops a problem, the onset of vitiation affecting occupants of a house will be rapid. The chain reaction that follows constitutes geometric progression. If you have nodded off on the sofa (flueless have never been allowed in bedrooms) you will be doomed.

Notified body

Product surveillance is undertaken by Notified Bodies.  I have not seen mention of them in all this anywhere. Who designed the appliance and performance in the context of probable use. Who decided on the air-vent requirements and subsequently checked that data. If it was not to be used in open-plan situations, which are common, how come that was not mentioned anywhere. There are of course a lot more questions that need to be asked of the designers.

How did anyone come to the conclusion that the ODS would work in the real world. What tests were carried out. What scenarios did they create. My best guess is that there could not have been any. The device works in isolation but will never work in situations where they are most likely to be needed. That cannot now be disputed. They can't prove they will work but they've got away with it knowing we cannot prove they don't work.

Until now that is, we have all the proof we need that they do not work. Therefore in my opinion they do not meet the CE approval requirements.

Burley

The picture at the top of this page is a flueless gas fire I fitted in an apartment for a lady pensioner. By the book and I have to ask you to take my word on that. Apartment pristine. It was not serviced after twelve months or even the second anniversary though it was only occasionally used, mostly for the flame effect. Two CO detectors in the apartment and one smoke detector.

One Saturday night as she was preparing a snack her smoke alarm kicked off. Acrid smoke was pouring out of the flueless. As I had fitted a rigid fan gas cock on the branch feeding the appliance it was turned off there. Before disturbing it in any way I wrote a polite letter to Burley and never had a reply. I then wrote to the Company Secretary by recorded delivery and never had a reply. Burley are quoted in the advertorial but I could not get a quote. Appliance recycled now as is all their literature.

Appliance design

While I'm on the subject. Surely it is time that design of appliances included a realistic stab at the probable installation scenarios. We've already seen far too many CO events, some fatal, involving long thin flues serving modern boilers, that can never realistically be checked as they are put beyond reach in false ceilings, sometimes through neighbouring property or communal ceilings.

CO events should be almost impossible in the twenty first century but as homes are deliberately being designed more air-tight to conserve energy, the risk from these appalling appliances grows.

The last (back) page of the flueless gas fire manual demands inspection at least once per year and includes the comment that a check should be made to "ensure it is working safely and that there is no excessive build up of soot". It is clearly expected that some soot will routinely form which is not the case with traditional gas fires.

Every Registered Gas Installer knows that many if not most people tend to neglect servicing and too many of these novelty appliances seem to me to operate at the fringe of safety to begin with.

For consumers, there are endless perfectly safe room-sealed gas fires available and Baxi now make a room-sealed high-efficiency back-boiler. Why take any risk when there is no need to. You know it makes sense.

CO Detectors

Whatever you do get a CO detector and remember that unlike smoke detectors they have a limited life, usually five years. I have only used the American Kidde 900-0146UK model with digital display. It is downsized audibly to meet the UK (EU) standard and visually offers the much higher USA standard. I have only seen them at B&Q so far. We don't advertise on this site and never will but where safety is concerned that is an exception.

Footnote

It is true the installation manual for the killer flueless repeatedly asserts the burner pressure is factory set (which it was not) but despite assertions I have heard to the contrary, it also clearly indicates the burner pressure should be checked at commissioning (which is mandatory under GSIUR anyway). They say that is to ensure the meter and pipework are also satisfactory.

Given the huge burner pressure in real terms it seems likely to me the reported flame lift-off may have been accompanied by noise but that is only a guess.

I have yet to check the data supplied which alleges the gas injector was 38% oversized for the appliance.

That said the specialist inspector noted the burner pressure was accidentally set uncontrolled by the manufacturer, therefore the same as the dynamic pressure (22mb) and also noted the burner pressure should not be capable of being set so far above its (7mb) correct burner pressure anyway. It is understood the manufacturers have altered that.

But don't rely on it.

Nothing alters the fact that the Oxygen Depletion Sensors clearly do not work in real life situations on current evidence and that is my main concern. Until they do, backed up by good science, flueless gas fires are off the list, except to disconnect them.